Do chassis related problems render Corvette C7 Stingray and C7 Z06 literal death traps on four wheels?

At the time of inception of the newest generation of Corvette, Corvette's current chief "engineer" (quotation marks are always there due to truly questionable engineering practices that have been applied to this generation of Corvette) made a big noise about the newest Corvette's frame and chassis.

According to +Tadge Juechter , the newest Corvette managed not only to end up with a lighter frame but also a considerably more rigid one, something that supposedly set this newest generation far ahead of the previous fifth and sixth generations.  This in effect was supposedly translating into outstanding handling that would led to the best and most track capable Corvette ever...

So far, this part failed to pan out, with more and more questions rising regarding performance hampering heat build but... what about the other aspect of the newest Corvette's frame, its safety and crash worthiness implications?

As already pointed out here, like with the previous generations of Corvette and in spite of this uber new frame, +General Motors refused to have the newest Corvette tested by NHTSA and avoided a safety rating assigned to it. 

The previous refusal to have the Corvette tested relayed directly to the absolute lack of roll over safety incorporated in the design of the Corvette in the past, with two exceptions: Corvette C6 Z06 and C6 ZR1 which happened to have an actual fixed roof structure.  Of course not to raise buyers concerns regarding the main stay steel framed Corvettes of that period, GM never had the C6 aluminum framed Corvettes tested  which is very ironic all on its own.

But there is considerably more to this subject and lack of crash testing when Corvette C7 Stingray and Z06 are involved and it is certainly a pretty disturbing issue regarding crash worthiness of the latest generation of Corvette.

Unlike with the previous two generations of Corvette, what really sets the newest generation apart is the lack of the continuous longitudinal frame members that in the past were hydroformed from single pieces of aluminum through process of extrusion. 

These days, the longitudinal members are not single continuous pieces and instead, they are compound structures, using varying cross sections joined together through welding.

Now, even though this may be advantageous from the perspective of weigh savings, there are other consequences to it as well and something that neither Juechter or GM marketing never mentions: different behavior during front and front/side impact related collision.

The conventional wisdom dictates crash protection oriented design consisting of three separate impact zones on any car, front and rear impact energy absorbing crumple zones and very strong and rigid passenger protecting center safety cage, including adequate roll over protection.  Although this design has never been present on any Corvettes, as already mentioned, C6 Z06 and ZR1 came pretty close.  Although there was no a fully fledged safety cage, very beefy vertical reinforcements connected to the roof structure certainly created a very effective substitute.

During a sever front and rear impacts, in order for the crumple zones to performed as designed, the energy from collision impact should be fully accounted for through permanent material deformation.  If the overall construction of the chassis is not adequate, other forms of failure may occur, effectively rendering the crumple zones ineffective. These unintended forms of failure typical occur at the structure junction points where parts are connected together through either welding, riveting and other forms of fasteners.

With the last two generations of Corvette, this part was not an issue due to the continuous hydroformed beams in both steel and aluminum frame rails, giving the fixed roof versions a good chance to absorb substantial amounts of impact energy through deformation.

Unfortunately, this is no longer the case with the newest generation of Corvette due to the lack of continuous beams being used.  Of course, this may not be as much of a problem as long the design accounts for this part and allows the conjoint members to act in unison, thus retaining their intended purpose. 

And here is the problem with the newest generation of Corvette and it is two fold problem: not only there is no safety cage oriented design (the AARP crowd has to have its removable roof panel)  but the current frame design seems to have a problem with the front portions of the longitudinal beams shearing off at the junction points, in the area of the welds.

When the front portions shear off during severe impact, the energy absorbing deformation no longer takes place and instead, the passenger area, the same one that lacks the safety cage design is burdened with this task.  A quick look at the latest frame design clearly shows that the vertical members are considerably smaller than in the past.

The result?  There are already two fatalities involved here and a very clear indication that weight saving considerations and marketability took hefty precedent over lives of the occupants.  Ironically enough, the frame weight savings did not result in overall weigh reduction and in fact, the newest Corvettes are considerably heavier than the predecessors while being also less safe during collision.

Will GM correct this truly dangerous situation?  Unfortunately, there is no easy fix here and the newest Stingray and Z06 flagship are slated to carry the monikers of quintessential death traps on wheels for the duration of this generation of Corvette.

For comparison, here is the previous generation Z06 after front impact collision

and another one, this time after 225 mph crash

and here is the newest and greatest after front impact at considerably lower speed.

It is not very difficult to figure out which of the cars allowed the driver to walk away from the accident versus being carried out by the employees of the coroner's office.